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Handbook updates 
For those of you subscribing 
to the handbook, the following 
updates are included.
Custom Farming: An Alternative 
to Leasing – A3-15 (4 pages) 
Please add these files to your 
handbook and remove the out-
of-date material.
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The year 2018 witnessed arguably the largest trade war in human history, 
and the trade disputes between 
the United States and China 
quickly escalated to a scale 
without precedent. As of now, 
the United States imposed tariffs 
on more than $250 billion worth 
of products from China, and 
China retaliated with tariffs on 
more than $110 billion worth 
of U.S. products, including 
notably substantial tariffs on U.S. 
agricultural products such as 
soybeans, pork, and ethanol. 
Since the Trump-Xi G20 Summit 
in December 2018, we are 
effectively in a 90-day truce 
with the two sides agreeing to 
hold off further escalations and 
actively negotiate for a trade deal. 
Since January 2019, U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Lightihizer 
and Chinese Vice Premier Liu 
He led two rounds of mid-level 
and high-level negotiations and 
made some progress including the 
recent Chinese pledge to purchase 
an additional five million metric 
tons of soybeans (183.7 million 
bushels). It is also reported that 
before the March 2 deadline of the 
90-day truce, President Trump
may have a summit with Chinese
President Xi Jinping in China in
late February, after the Chinese
New Year, to negotiate the details
of the trade deal. That said, there
is still significant uncertainty
regarding the U.S.-China
agricultural trade: all tariffs such
as the 25 percent additional tariffs
on soybeans are still in effect, and
the negotiations still need to deal
with more difficult items such as
intellectual property protection,
market access of U.S. firms into
China and Chinese industry
subsidy policies.
In this article, I outline seven 
economic, cultural and political 
facts about China to better 
understand the trade war. The 
aim is to help U.S. producers, 
agricultural professionals, and 
policymakers to better understand 
the broader context of the trade 
war, the immediate and long-
term implications for U.S.-China 
economic relations especially U.S. 
agricultural exports to China, as 
well as the growing need to better 
understand Chinese agriculture 
and economy, producers and 
consumers. It is important to note 
that this article only represents my 
personal opinions of the evolving 
trade issues. 
1. Row crop agricultural
production is not China’s
comparative advantage
A critical economic concept 
related to agricultural trade is 
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comparative advantage, which refers to the ability 
of a country to produce a product at a lower 
opportunity cost than that of trade partners. In 
agricultural trade, this, in essence, drives countries 
with higher production costs for agricultural 
products to be customers of those who are more 
cost-efficient. This is a particularly useful concept 
to understand why China has become a leading 
customer of U.S. agricultural exports because 
row crop agricultural production is not China’s 
comparative advantage.
There are both natural and social constraints in 
China’s agricultural productions, especially when 
compared to the United States. Although China 
and the United States cover roughly the same land 
area, the amount of arable land – land that could be 
farmed – is limited for China. In general, China has 
seven percent of the world’s arable land but needs 
to feed almost one-fifth of the world’s population, 
while the United States boasts more than 15 percent 
of the global arable land with only four percent of the 
global population. Many U.S. Corn Belt states enjoy 
ample precipitation for profitable rain-fed row crop 
production, by comparison, most major agricultural 
production areas in China rely heavily on irrigation. 
Furthermore, the soil and land quality are arguably 
significantly better in the United States than in 
China. The societal constraints further hinder the 
production efficiency of Chinese agriculture. China 
has at least 270 million farmers actively engaged in 
crop or livestock production compared to 3.2 million 
for the United States, which results in less than two 
acres, on average, for a typical Chinese farming 
household (Zhang and Li 2018). In addition, China 
also bans planting of genetically modified corn and 
soybean varieties. As a result, the most productive 
provinces in China could only produce 50-60 percent 
of the corn or soybean yields when compared to the 
statewide average yields recently seen in Iowa. There 
is the potential to increase yields substantially – some 
Heilongjiang farmers raise 200- bushel corn. 
China also has long-standing food security policies 
that shape the composition of their agricultural 
import demand. In particular, China regards rice and 
wheat as critical food crops that are directly used for 
food consumption, and maintains a 100 percent self-
sufficiency ratio, and thus are neither major exporters 
nor importers of rice or wheat. Similarly, China could 
produce 97 percent of its pork domestically with 
half of the pigs in the world in China. In contrast, 
China plays a much more significant role in the 
international feed grain markets. For example, China 
could only satisfy 15 percent of its need for soybean 
consumption via domestic production, and could 
play a bigger role in the ethanol and corn markets as 
China pushes forward its 2020 E10 ethanol mandate 
(Li et al. 2017), and incentivize more corn for silage 
production domestically.
Brookings Institute estimated that 88 percent of the 
next billion middle class will be in Asia with more 
than 330 million additional citizens in China. With 
the Chinese economy projected to continue its 
growth, likely at a lower rate around 5-6.5 percent 
over the next decade, China will continue to be one 
of the most important trading partners with U.S. 
agriculture, once the trade disputes are resolved.  
2. China definitely suffers greater
economic loss, however, the trade
retaliation has disproportionally large
impacts on agricultural states like Iowa
Undoubtedly China will incur greater economic 
loss from the trade war: our previous analysis using 
a general equilibrium trade model reveals that if 
the United States loses about a quarter percent 
off its economy due to the tariffs effective as of 
January 2019, the Chinese economy will suffer a 
1.3 percent loss (Li, Balistreri, and Zhang 2018). 
Many other countries and regions, especially major 
exporters of manufactured goods to the United 
States such as Mexico, gain from the trade disputes 
between the United States and China. In 2018, the 
China Shanghai Composite Stock Market Index 
has decreased from near 3,600 (POINTS?) in 
January 2018 to less than 2,500 in January 2019. 
In particular, the Chinese electronic equipment 
and other machinery sectors, which rely heavily on 
exports, suffered most significantly. These economic 
losses translated into incentives and willingness for 
China to engage in trade negotiations for possible 
trade deals. 
However, despite modest economic impacts for 
the U.S. economy as a whole, U.S. agricultural 
industry and agricultural states such as Iowa suffer 
disproportionally large impacts from the trade 
disruptions. Our previous analysis of China’s trade 
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retaliation strategies suggests that China tends 
to target agricultural products for economic and 
political damages, especially when the products are 
easily substituted by supplies from U.S. competitors 
or alternative products (Li, Zhang, and Hart 
2018). A recent Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD) analysis on the impacts of the 
trade disruptions on the Iowa economy shows that 
the overall losses in Iowa’s Gross State Product are 
calculated to be $1 to $2 billion off the total Gross 
State Product of $190 billion (Balistreri et al. 2018). 
This translates into a half- to full-percent loss off the 
Iowa economy. In particular, the average estimated 
loss to Iowa’s soybean, corn, hog, and ethanol 
industries are $545 million, $333 million, $776 
million, and $105 million respectively. 
3. Trade disruptions give China strategic 
incentives to further diversify away from 
the United States, potentially benefitting 
our competitors
One long-term impact of the trade disruption is 
that it gives China even more strategic incentives 
to diversify away from the United States. In 2016, 
China bought over 60 percent of U.S. soybean 
exports, but even then China was buying even more 
soybeans from Brazil. Due to strong and growing 
Chinese demand, Brazilian soybean acreage has 
risen from 25 million hectares in 2012 to 35 million 
hectares for the 2018/19 season. In 2006, the United 
States exported more meat to China than all our 
competitors combined. However, over the past 
decade the United States has lost market share as 
China increased meat imports from the world. This 
is in part related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 
also known as China’s 21st Century Silk Road, which 
better connects the European hog suppliers with 
China via new railroads. But this also represents 
China’s active diversification in their meat exports 
even before the trade war: in 2016, Europe supplied 
more pork to China than the United States, while 
Australia, Brazil, and Uruguay dominated the beef 
imports by China. Intuitively, the trade disruptions 
could accelerate China’s diversification away 
from the United States, potentially benefitting our 
competitors.
Current trade disruptions also tie our hands in 
realizing the future growth opportunities resulting 
from Chinese domestic agricultural markets. I want 
to highlight three examples: First, China now has 
an E10 ethanol mandate that requires all gasoline 
to be blended with 10 percent ethanol by 2020, but 
currently, Chinese domestic ethanol production 
is not sufficient and thus needs to import either 
corn or ethanol. However, currently, U.S. ethanol 
has a prohibitive 70 percent tariff rate. The other 
two examples are related to a potential increase in 
Chinese pork import demand due to the ongoing 
African Swine Fever as well as the growing appetite 
for beef consumption especially for urban Chinese 
residents. Importantly, Chinese demand is so large 
that changes in its domestic policies or markets 
would have significant implications for international 
commodity markets.
4. Arguably both China and U.S. have
strategic misjudgments early on about
the trade war, exposing lack of mutual
understandings and eroding mutual trust.
Although trade issues are one of the major topics 
during President Trump’s 2016 presidential 
campaign, I think the rapid escalations of the trade 
war to its current unprecedented scale arguably 
exposed the strategic misjudgments by both sides 
regarding the intentions and resolve of the other 
side. For China, many people including several 
prominent policy advisors relied on the historical 
departure of U.S. campaign rhetoric and actual 
policies and thought the trade war would be unlikely 
or at least limited in scale. For the U.S., arguably 
the policymakers underestimated the resolve and 
speed of Chinese response, the challenging nature 
of resolving issues such as intellectual property 
protection and market access, and the complexity 
of simultaneously engaging in trade disputes with 
Mexico, EU, Japan, and other countries. Trade 
disruptions are often easy to start but often have 
long-term implications: the U.S.-China 2010 chicken 
vs. tire trade disputes essentially resulted in a loss of 
a $1 billion U.S. poultry export market to China now 
supplied by our competitors, even after a decade this 
market has not returned to previous levels (Li Zhang 
and Hart 2018).
One critical issue exposed from this trade war, 
unfortunately, is the lack of mutual understanding 
and effective communications between the United 
States and China, and the quickly eroding mutual 
trust or the growing mistrust. For example, many 
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Iowans know former Governor Branstad is currently 
the U.S. Ambassador to China, but many have never 
heard of China’s emerging e-commerce giants, 
such as Alibaba, or do not know that Chinese 
hog production actually overlaps with populous 
provinces but not major corn production areas. In 
contrast, the typical Chinese citizen would not know 
U.S. soybeans are actually imported mainly as feed 
grains and thus could not be substituted just by 
switching to a cooking oil other than soybean oil. 
More importantly, so far all rounds of negotiations 
almost never resulted in joint statements by the 
two sides, but rather separate statements often 
with inconsistent messages and full of political 
jargon. A particularly hindering moment was when 
China agreed to buy seven billion dollars' worth of 
agricultural and energy products in June 2018 and 
thought the trade war would end, and discovered a 
week later it was back on. That in part explains why 
“ongoing verification and effective enforcement” are 
demanded to be a critical part of any trade deal.
5. China is a country of rapid change: your 
accurate knowledge about China five 
years ago may not apply today
China and U.S.-China trade issues and negotiations 
have been dominating the news; however, I 
encourage you to take this opportunity to learn more 
about contemporary China. China is a country of 
rapid change, and this means that even for frequent 
visitors to China your knowledge that was accurate 
even five years ago may not apply to today. For the 
general economy, China quickly becomes a country 
that leads the world in the construction of high-speed 
rail over the past decade. China now has more miles 
of high-speed rails than all other countries combined, 
with over 60 percent of these miles constructed in 
the past five years. In addition, Chinese students 
often make the largest group of foreign students in 
American and European universities, with over 40 
percent of international students currently in Iowa 
coming from China (Zhou 2018). But a major shift 
is underway: in 2001 when China joined WTO, 
only one in ten Chinese students returned to China 
after studying abroad. In 2017, it was eight in ten of 
the 600,000 Chinese students who studied abroad 
returning post-graduation. 
The agricultural sector in China has also witnessed 
significant changes over the last decade: In 2007, 
there was no crop or livestock insurance, but now 
China is the second largest agricultural insurance 
market in the world. Twenty years ago there was 
no medical insurance coverage for Chinese rural 
residents, and now over 96 percent of them are 
enrolled in the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Insurance which covers 75 percent of the in-patient 
medical expenses. There are three important new 
trends in the Chinese agricultural industry: In 2017, 
China started a new national mandate for all gasoline 
to be blended with E10 ethanol by 2020; per-capita 
beef consumption in China rose almost by 20 
percent over the last five years, and the Belt and Road 
Initiative started in 2013 has significantly reduced 
the transportation time between Europe and China.   
6. Both the Chinese economy and U.S.-
China relations are at critical inflection
points.
The unprecedented trade war of 2018 is indicative 
and informative that both the Chinese economy and 
the U.S.-China economic relations are at critical 
inflection points. After four decades of phenomenal 
economic growths and deepening bilateral ties with 
the United States, the Chinese economy recently 
experienced significant challenges and many 
speculated that the Chinese economy is slowing 
to an annual speed of 5-6 percent over the next 
decade. Arguably, that is still pretty fast, however, 
the Chinese economy faces structural reforms that 
are more challenging than ever before. How China 
Became Capitalist, an insightful book by Nobel 
Laureate Ronald Coase, forcefully articulated that 
the Chinese economic growth benefited with gradual 
market reforms with regional experimentation 
and local trials (Coase and Wang 2012). However, 
currently many Chinese people feel that federal 
and local government employees, state-owned 
enterprises, upper social class have significant unfair 
economic advantages, and the public trust of the 
government’s pledge to “let the market to play a 
decisive role” is quickly eroding. One example of the 
governmental dominance is the lack of independent 
and research-based analysis on the actual impacts 
of the trade disruptions on various Chinese sectors 
and provinces, or the ban on publicizing these 
studies that might contradict Chinese government’s 
positions. 
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More importantly, the trade war is reflective of 
the status of potentially deteriorating U.S.-China 
relations. A Pew Research Center survey in August 
2018 shows that American attitudes toward China 
have become somewhat less positive over the past 
year: Overall, 38 percent of Americans have a 
favorable opinion of China, down slightly from 44 
percent in 2017 (Wike and Devlin 2018). At the 
same time, the same survey also shows that globally 
70 percent of people think China plays a bigger role 
in the world despite a lack of enthusiasm for Chinese 
world leadership. One of the most striking surprises 
for the Chinese policymakers is that U.S. business 
leaders, who are often advocates for expanding 
economic ties with China, joined the policymakers 
arguing for a tougher stance when dealing with 
China. This reflects the disappointment in recent 
stagnation in China’s critical market reforms, but 
also reflects the general attitude shift in the U.S. to 
treat China as a strategic competitor. The growing 
confrontation also adds fuel to the discussion of 
the prospect of greater U.S.-China confrontation, 
and in particular, whether China and the U.S. are 
destined for the so-called Thucydides Trap, which 
is the idea that when one great power is rising it 
will inevitably threaten to displace the established 
power, consistently resulting in war (Allison 2017). 
While this is unlikely, concerns are growing in both 
countries regarding a new cold war between the 
United States and China. 
A greater danger to me is the immediate and 
intermediate impacts of rising nationalism. In China, 
the hope to be more self-reliant on “core technology” 
could potentially disproportionally benefit Chinese 
state-owned enterprises, and hinder or delay long-
overdue structural reform. In the U.S., there is 
growing risks of policies that restrict its ability to 
attract, train and retain talents from across the globe. 
7. Chinese consumers and producers 
increasingly think and act like their U.S. 
counterparts, at least economically.
Finally, I want to encourage Iowans and U.S. citizens 
to pay less attention to the apparent cultural and 
societal differences between China and the United 
States but recognize that Chinese producers and 
consumers increasingly think and act like yourself 
or your neighbors. Although Chinese agricultural 
producers do not own land privately, the 30-year 
contract rights essentially give them free reign 
regarding their crop choice, land rental choice, 
and marketing strategies. Increasingly, Chinese 
governmental structures look less and less like 
the Soviet Union system but rather similar to the 
governmental structures of the United States. As 
mentioned above, Chinese producers now have crop 
insurance, ethanol mandate, planted acre subsidies, 
and also face agri-environmental regulations. Chinese 
consumers fundamentally prioritize food quality, 
school quality, air and water quality, and quality of 
life for themselves and their kids.  
Conclusion
China is and will continue to be one of the most 
important trading partners with U.S. agriculture, 
and the trade disruptions suggest that we need to 
understand China economically, culturally and 
politically. In this article, I offer seven personal 
observations that hopefully provided a context for 
you to better understand the U.S.-China trade war, as 
well as the Chinese agriculture and economy.
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Internet Updates
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Current Profitability
The following tools have been updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/info/outlook.html. 
Corn Profitability – A1-85
Soybean Profitability – A1-86 
Iowa Cash Corn and Soybean Prices – A2-11
Season Average Price Calculator – A2-15
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